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Note to the revised version: this conference paper was somewhat hastily prepared in the midst of one of the most 
brutal recession since the 1930s. I revised the original 2009 version, basically to correct some embarrassing 
notation mistakes in my maths, while trying to keep the text as close as possible to the original. I added a post-
face to mention a few developments that occurred since this conference in 2009. Thanks (sic) to the Great Trade 
Collapse, the subject matter of “Global Value Chains” has raised prominently in the academics’ and policy 
maker’ agendas, and a review of the most recent literature on the subject would now require dedicated volumes.  
 
The nature of international trade and the very nature of globalization have changed dramatically in 
recent years, with the emergence of new global players and a radically different competitive landscape. 
This new landscape emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Berlin Wall fall brought 
down the barriers that had split the post-WWII world, and the Brady Bonds put an end to the decade-
long debt crisis that plagued many developing countries. The 1990s saw the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and the birth of the WTO, which brought down many trade barriers and led to further 
liberalization in areas like telecommunications, financial services and information technologies. 
This transformation, which was both geopolitical and economic, was accompanied by the emergence of 
new business models that built on new opportunities to develop comparative advantages (Krugman, 
1995; Baldwin, 2006). With the opening of new markets, the technical revolution in IT and 
communications, and the closer harmonization of economic models worldwide, trade became much 
more than just a simple exchange of merchandise across borders. It developed into a constant flow of 
investment, of technologies and technicians, of goods for processing and business services, in what has 
been called the "Global Supply Chain". In this global manufacturing model, products are no more 
“Made in UK”, not even “Made in China”, but actually “Made in the World”. The Boston Consulting 
Group calls “globality” this new era of global business competition   (Bhattacharya et al., 2008). 
Those changes led the American author Tom Freidman to proclaim that "The World is flat". This new 
business model where countries do not trade wine for clothes anymore but “trade in tasks”, as described 
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008), amounts to a "Copernican revolution" for 
understanding international trade. It compelled trade analysts and international economists to revise 
their old beliefs and models (Baldwin, 2006). Trade statisticians and national account specialists have 
also been struggling to adapt their statistics to the new reality (Escaith, 2008). Despite important 
advances, the economic analysis of global value chains is still lacking appropriate models and good 
data to understand and measure appropriately this new dimension of globalization.  
Twenty years after its emergence, 2 this new global business model was challenged on two grounds 
after the Great Recession which followed the financial crisis of September 2008:  
                                                 
1  Economic Research and Statistics Division-WTO, Geneva;  DEFI, Université de la Méditerranée, Aix-en-
Provence. The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not represent a position, 
official or unofficial, of the WTO Secretariat or WTO Members. 
2  Offshoring is not new, and the 1960s saw several success stories of factory-less designer brands in sportswear 
or clothes. But international supply chain management truly became the building block of global business 
administration in the late 1980s. 
2 
 
- First, because global supply chains were pointed by several analysts as a causing factor of 
the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009, and they had to be restrained in any post-crisis 
scenario;  
- Second, because a return to “business as usual” after the international crisis was not 
deemed possible on objective economic ground, nor found desirable for normative social or 
environmental reasons.  
Indeed, if the cause of the global crisis of 2008-2009 was clearly financial, its particular mode of 
dissemination through real channels has been related to the interdependency created by global 
productive networks, which served both as transmission and amplification channels. While the crisis 
spread initially to all developed countries through toxic assets and exposure to the US financial market 
and seemed to spare the developing economies, the premise of a new North-South "decoupling" 
vanished rapidly when the contagion spread to the real economy through the trade collapse. The 
amplitude and simultaneity of the transmission of shocks came as a surprise to many analysts. 
International supply chains, one of the most salient features of the "new globalization" were rapidly 
identified as one of the main factors for such a synchronization of shocks. For its intensity, the crisis 
has been dubbed the “Great Trade Collapse”: the dive of world trade was unprecedented, even in 
comparison with the Great Depression of the 1930s (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009). 
Moreover, the implications of a global rebalancing, with the centre of gravity of world demand shifting 
from West to East, was expected to deprive global supply chains from their “raison d’être”, which is 
providing Western customers with cheap and diversified products. With unemployment increasing as 
recession spread in developed countries, the debate was also put on the public place; the delocalization 
of investment and jobs that sits behind these global productive networks, together with the lack of 
governance in international finance, became the focus of much public scrutiny.  
Against this background, this communication explores in a first section the particular role of supply 
chains in transmitting and amplifying external shocks. A second part analyses their potential 
responsibility in the 2008-2009 trade collapse, and a third one is dedicated to exit scenarios and the 
perspective of global supply chains after the crisis, including some of the consequences of global 
rebalancing for least developed countries. 
Supply chains as transmission channels 
Since the every-day reality of international business models is running faster than the elaboration of 
new analytical paradigms, the crisis hit the global economy in largely uncharted waters. Like in 
previous global financial crisis, the international banking system came to a "sudden stop" after 
September 2008. Two aspects were nevertheless original: the shock emanated from the largest world 
financial centre instead of initiating in developing countries, and the shocks spread very quickly and 
almost simultaneously to many industrial and emerging countries. In particular, trade reacted very 
strongly to the first signals of recession, and industries were differently affected. The sectors most 
affected by the recession were fuels and minerals (due to a strong price effect), and machinery and 
transport equipment (strong demand effect).  
With the financial crisis, the sectors producing consumer durable and capital goods were on the front 
line, as demand for these products relies on credit. In turn, the lower industrial activity reversed brutally 
the trend in the prices of key primary commodities, which had been rising substantively since 2003, at 
the point to qualify for the qualification of “bubble”. Trend reversal was abrupt, and between the third 
and the fourth quarter of 2008, the drop in quarterly growth rate was, respectively, 45 and 43 
percentage points for iron and steel, and for minerals (Table 1). The collapse in trade mostly affected 
merchandises; except the financial transactions, the commercial services, other than those related to 
trade in goods (i.e., freight and insurance), were more resilient. 
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Table 1 Quarterly growth of world manufactures exports by product, Q1/2008-Q4/2009 
(Quarter-on-quarter percentage change in current dollar values) 
Quarter/Sectors  Q1/08 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 
Manufactures -1 9 -2 -15 -21 7 9 9 
Office and telecom equipment -12 5 5 -10 -27 13 14 16 
Automotive products 1 6 -14 -18 -33 14 13 21 
Iron and steel 11 23 7 -34 -31 -8 10 10 
Ores and other minerals 10 20 4 -33 -35 13 24 7 
 Source: WTO 
Indeed, 2009 world trade dropped five times more rapidly than global GDP, supply chains playing their 
part in explaining the magnifying effect of the crisis on international trade. Some of the mechanisms are 
of purely accounting nature: while GDP is computed on a net basis, exports and imports are registered 
on their gross value. In addition, because supply chains cover various countries, a lot of double 
counting takes place while goods for processing cross the borders at each step of the production 
process. But the core of the explanation is to be found in the nature itself of the 2008-2009 crises and its 
mode of contagion. 
 
Box 1  The Microeconomics of Supply Chains and Trade in Tasks
The question of what steers imports and exports has a very long history in the economic literature. Traditional normative 
trade theory is built on the premises of gains from international trade, based on the Ricardo's arguments of comparative 
advantages which allow increasing output by reallocating resources within countries. The Hecksher-Ohlin model extends 
the results when there are many productive factors and different factor endowments which create gains from international 
specialization. Economic theory points also to other sources of gains which are not liked to comparative advantages, for 
example access to a wider variety of goods and economies of scale on the consumption and production sides, or 
contesting monopoly powers on the institutional one. The critic and testing of these traditional hypotheses has led to a 
vast literature (see WTO 2008 for a review). 
Trade in tasks and the fragmentation of production along global supply chains has challenged the validity of the 
traditional models, based on the exchange of final goods. As for trade in intermediate goods, two main approaches have 
been explored. The first one rests on the hypothesis that factors (capital and labour) are fixed. Offshoring is similar to 
technical progress in the production of the final good: by shifting production processes to the countries with comparative 
advantages, more of the final goods can be produced with the same (fixed) amount of factors. A firm with better 
technology at home will offshore some tasks if the initial wage gap is larger than the offshoring costs. Offshoring releases 
domestic workers who, under the traditional neo-classical market assumptions, can focus on the tasks where they have a 
trade-cost-adjusted comparative advantage. 
When some factors are mobile sectorally and internationally, the law of comparative advantage can be generalized, 
albeit analysing the outcome of even simple normative models becomes a complex matter, particularly regarding the 
distributional effects. Comparative advantages are no more a robust predictor of a country's trade pattern. For example, 
reversal of comparative advantages is possible under certain assumptions. When factors are mobile, movement of 
factors between sectors and between countries that tend to equalize endowments reduce the incentives to trade. The 
return of the mobile factor rises, while those of sector-specific factors decline. But if factor prices are not equalized, factor 
mobility will at contrary lead to an increase in the volume of trade. 
The new trade theory, by introducing imperfect competition, consumer preference for variety and economies of scale, 
look at explaining why countries that are similar in factor endowment and technology, have a significant part of their trade 
in the same industries. When two such identical countries open up to trade, firms with differentiated products gain access 
to larger markets and offer more choice to consumers. But because the total size of the market does not increase, some 
firms will go out of business.  
A similar pattern can be used to model trade in intermediate goods; provided the cost of production is lower the larger is 
the number and scale of production of intermediates. If trade is restricted, the domestic firm needs to use outsourcing to 
realize these economies of scale and choice. When trade is free, it does not matter where the production of 
intermediaries is located, and the firm producing the final good uses a mix of outsourcing and offshoring. 
Source: Based on WTO (2008) World Trade Report 
 
International transmission of shocks takes usually two forms, commercial and financial. In previous 
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instances of global crisis, most of the systemic commercial and financial shocks where of 
macroeconomic nature. The present crisis has also a systemic micro-economic dimension, because of 
the geographical segmentation of the productive chains. These effects are still largely unknown as they 
affect firms that are eminently "heterogeneous", as recognized by the new "new trade theory". It is a 
cliché to say that time is accelerating, but it carries a lot of truth in the present situation. In the race 
between the practitioners –engineering and business schools– on the one hand, and the university, on 
the other hand, praxis is well ahead despite significant advances in the theoretical aspects (Box1).  
In previous occurrences of global turmoil, shocks were mainly of macroeconomic nature. A recession 
in a foreign economy reduced demand for exports, which in turn depressed the activity in the home 
country. The propagation of such demand-driven shocks through the productive sectors of the home 
economy can be traced using an input-output model, through traditional Input-Output modelling. In 
addition, both financial and real channels are interlinked at the macro level, because credit crunch 
affects household consumption and firms' investment. 
The gradual substitution of trade in goods by trade in tasks that took place during the 1990s changed 
this traditional mode of transmission, and added another layer of transmitters which are operating at 
micro economic level. When industrial production is spread across various countries, and that all 
segments of the chain are critical (supplied constrained), a shock affecting one segment of the chain 
will reverberate through all the chain. At the difference of the macro-economic case, shocks are moving 
forward, from supplier to clients, and not backward as in the demand-driven Leontief model (from 
client to suppliers). 
Escaith and Gonguet (2009) (E-G09 thereafter) jointly models the financial and real supply-side effects 
from a complementary viewpoint of monetary circuit and international Input-Output matrices. In order 
to produce, individual firms need to obtain a loan from a bank. The bank grants the loan in relation to 
three parameters: the macroeconomic context, the specific behaviour of the sector of activity in the 
business cycle, and the specific situation of the firm (credit rating, soundness of the management).   
 Money created by the bank when according the loan is spent by the firm on wages and other 
production costs. This money remains in the circuit as long as the firm does not sell the products and 
reimburse the loan.  A traditional result of the endogenous money theory is that any increase in stock of 
credit money corresponds to an increase in inventories in the national account circuit. E-G09 adds to 
this classical building blocks a late 20th century feature: 3 the capital-asset adequacy ratio, a prudential 
mechanism –such as in Basel I and II– set by the authorities and designed to guarantee liquidity and 
solvability of the banking sector. At the difference of monetary circuit and I-O tables, which track 
flows, the adequacy ratio is a stock variable reflecting the accumulation of loans and assets.  
Under normal conditions, the ratio is not binding and the circuit is almost a pure flow model. Bank can 
modulate their assets to accommodate new credits, and client firms can shift to alternative partners 
when faced with the unexpected failure of one of their suppliers. But shifting to an alternative supplier, 
when decision results from an unexpected event (a shock), always carries a cost (paying the spot-
market price instead of the negotiated one for merchandises and transportation, using air-freight instead 
of shipping lines, etc.).  
The real and monetary circuit can interfere negatively when an unexpected financial shock, such as a 
credit crunch affecting production or trade finance, impede a foreign supplier to fulfil its contractual 
engagement. As mentioned, when confronted to such a disruption of their supply chain, client firms can 
shift to alternative partners, but paying a premium price. Higher production costs are transmitted along 
the global supply, reducing firms' profitability, while the longer production circuit increase demand for 
loans. The transmission across sectors and countries of the increased cost of production is modelled by 
E-G09 using an international input-output matrix (a set of interlinked national I-O matrices), rearranged 
to track forward linkages.4 
                                                 
3  Even if endogenous money and sectoral modeling seems quite heterodox now-a-days, both monetary circuit 
and supply-use tables can be traced to the Physiocrats.  
4  In an international IO matrix (I-IO), cross-national transactions of intermediate goods are identified: exports 
of intermediate consumption are separated from final demand and traced to the importing country and sector. 
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E-G09 computes an indicator, called "imported real supply-driven impact coefficient" (IRSIC), defined 
as:  
IRSIC = ΔQ.(I-B)-1 ● 1/Q         Eq. 1 
Where, for "n" countries and "s" sectors:  
Q: line vector of initial sectoral outputs for all countries (1 x n.s) 
B : matrix of technical coefficients (n.s x n.s) 5 
(I-B)-1: Ghosh-inverse matrix, i.e. the sum of direct and indirect forward effects 
ΔQ: line vector of supply shocks (initial increases in sectoral production costs emanating from the 
shock-exporter country “i”)   (1 x n.s, with Δqj.s=0, j≠i) 
● : Hadamard (entry wise) product 
 
Albeit the supply oriented Ghosh matrices are very similar to the Leontief demand-driven model, their 
theoretical robustness for modelling real shocks is much weaker, in particular because it cannot track 
substitution effects in presence of bottlenecks. For this reason, IRSIC is used only (i) in the price space, 
and (ii) as a tracking mechanism.   
Results based on an international I-O matrix based on IDE-JETRO data, covering the USA, Japan, 
Korea and selected emerging Asian countries, and updated to 2006 by the authors, indicate that: 
1. In 2000 and 2006, Japan is the largest potential exporter of cost-push supply shocks, because 
it is a large supplier of intermediate goods to the other economies.6 
2. Malaysia and Thailand are the largest importers of such shocks, because of the high degree 
of integration of their manufacturing sectors in international supply chains and their reliance on 
imported inputs rather than domestic ones.  
3. Between 2000 and 2006, China increased notably its forward international linkages and its 
domestic backward linkages. It became a large exporter of "shocks" in 2006, at par with Japan, but 
its vulnerability to an imported shock remained relatively stable because Chinese manufacturers 
are increasingly relying on domestic suppliers. 
4. Repatriating the production of manufactured parts in Japan and the USA would lead to an 
average increase in total sectoral production costs of 2%. Albeit this seems a small impact, it 
should be remembered that the input-output matrix used to compute the coefficients are based on 
nation-wide samples of enterprises. For these developed economies, most intermediate 
consumption is sourced domestically. In addition, new “new trade theory” reminds us of the 
decisive impact of firm heterogeneity when it comes to understanding international economics. 
Only a minority of firms actively engage in outsourcing, and the 2% average cost increase would 
fall disproportionately on a few firms, causing serious disruptions at microeconomic level. 
Because these outward oriented firms are also the most dynamic and innovative ones, these 
                                                                                                                                                          
This provides a better definition of vertical network participation of the countries included in the I-IO, 
allowing tracking shock transmission caused by vertical integration. 
5  In a typical supply-use table, horizontal lines show the use of goods and services to supply other firms, final 
consumers and rest of the world (exports). The vertical columns describe the requirements by sector j: 
purchases from suppliers (domestic and rest of the world) needed to produce the goods, value added and taxes. 
Inter-sectoral relationships are represented by the coefficients Qij. The technical coefficients conforming the 
input-output matrix (I-O) are derived by normalizing the intermediate coefficients Qij by the value of total 
production (aij= Qij/Qj). These I-O coefficients present the direct requirements of inputs from "i" for 
producing one unit of output of industry "j". As in the Leontief case, the Ghosh matrix B, (bij= Qij/Qi).  is 
build using the inter-sectoral transaction matrix Qij, but the allocation coefficients are normalized in line 
(destination of output) by the value of production, and not in column as for technical coefficients (origin of 
productive factors used in the production). The Ghosh matrices are similar to the Leontief demand-driven 
model, but their theoretical robustness for modeling supply shock is much weaker. For this reason, E-G09 uses 
them only as a tracking mechanism. 
6  [revised version] Using a similar methodology, Escaith et al. (2011) measure the impact on neighbouring 
economies of the March 2011 disaster which devastated Japanese coasts and disrupted supply chains.  
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microeconomic disruptions would have significant negative systemic effects. 
The accumulation of micro-disruptions in the productive chain, typical of a recession, disturbs the 
monetary circuit: production plans take longer to be completed, leading to an accumulation of 
outstanding loans, a lower profit margin and a reduction of the credit worthiness of firms. Under Basel 
II, banks have to adjust their asset holding in order to compensate for the higher risk of their loan 
portfolio. This is not an issue when financial markets are functioning normally, but in times of global 
crisis and flight to liquidity, not only the risk profile of borrowers deteriorates, but also the market 
value of assets goes down. Because assets are priced to market, banks can rapidly be squeezed when 
evaluating their capital adequacy ratio: They are confronted to the rising risk-ratings of their debtors on 
the one hand, and the shrinking value of their asset portfolio on the other hand.  
When such situation arises, as happened after September 2008, the circuit unravels: banks run for 
safety, stop extending new credit and even do not renew existing credit lines. The very same pro-
cyclical mechanisms that led to the apparition of financial bubbles, with the concomitant asset price 
inflation and lower perception to risk (meaning lower interest rates and larger volume of credit), can 
have a catastrophic outcome when the trend is reversed and a resonance effect between real and 
financial circuits amplifies the initial supply shocks.   
Moreover, the accumulation of supply shocks leads to secondary demand-driven adjustments, either 
through a price effect (increasing production costs translate into higher retail prices and lower demand) 
or income effect (lower activity leading to unemployment). The succession of micro waves followed by 
secondary macro shocks leads to "W" or even “L” crisis patterns and can be jointly modelled through 
international I-O. 7 
 
Crisis, exits and (de)globalization  
 
Trade in tasks and the greater interconnections of the global economy have created, as we saw, newer 
and faster channels for the propagation of adverse external shocks. Because production is 
internationally diversified, adverse external shocks affect firms not only through final demand, but also 
through a rupture in the flow of inputs received from their suppliers.  
• Trade Collapse: the Role of Supply Chains   
 
• Structural Trade Elasticity 
Various authors attribute the large drop in trade registered since the end of 2008 (figure 1) —with an 
apparent trade-GDP elasticity close to 5— to the leverage effect induced by the geographical 
fragmentation of production (Tanaka, 2009; Yi, 2009). Others contest the hypothesis of higher demand 
elasticity due to vertical integration (Benassy-Queré et al., 2009) because it affects only the relative 
volume of trade in relation to GDP, while elasticity should remain constant in a general equilibrium 
context. It is probable that the observed reality lays somewhere in-between the variable trade elasticity 
hypothesis and the constant one.  
                                                 
7 IRSIC is well suited to model the secondary demand effects created by an increase in prices: after adjusting the 
price effect by their respective demand elasticity, E-G09 applies a traditional Leontief model to the 
international input-output matrix. But a similar reasoning can be applied to a demand shock caused by 
unemployment and lower income. 
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Figure 1  World merchandise exports and GDP, 1960-2010 
(Real annual percentage change) 
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics (revised June 2011). 
 
As seen in Figure 2, the world trade elasticity 
is shaped like an inversed "U", increasing at 
the end of the 1980s and decreasing in the most 
recent years. Because elasticity should indeed 
remain constant in an equilibrium context, this 
humped shape probably signals a long-term 
transition from one steady state to a new one. 
World trade and GDP are aggregated 
indicators, therefore two structural changes can 
be at work: within countries (technological 
shocks and change in business models), and 
between them (emergence of economies with 
different production functions). 
Short-term shocks can also affect apparent 
elasticity, even in presence of stable structural 
relationships. These short-term variations are 
to be expected when external shocks do not 
apply uniformly to all industries. A negative 
shock suffered by a single sector with high 
reliance on imported input will initially 
translate into a higher change in trade than in 
total GDP, leading to higher elasticity.  
In absence of structural changes affecting production function (i.e., when technical coefficients, as 
described by an input-output matrix, are constant), the relationship linking import for intermediate 
consumption (IC ) with demand can be described by the following linear relationship: 
ΔMIC =  M°. (I-A)-1 . ΔD              Eq. 2 
Where, in the case of a single country with "s" sectors): 8 
ΔMIC endogenous variations in total imported inputs (s x 1) 
M°: diagonal matrix of intermediate import coefficients (s x s) 
(I-A)-1  : Leontief inverse, where A is the matrix of fixed technical coefficients (s x s)  
ΔD : initial exogenous final demand shocks (s x 1) 9 
                                                 
8 The model can be extended easily to the case of "n" countries, as in E-G09 by modifying accordingly the 
summation vector "u". 
Figure 2 World:  GDP Elasticity of Imports, 
10 year average. 
 
Note: Rolling windows of 10 years; the date indicates the 
last year.  World GDP is the sum of countries' data using 
market exchange rates; 2009 based on forecasts.  
Source: Escaith, Lindenberg and Miroudot (2010) 
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Similarly, changes in total production [ΔQ  ] caused by the demand shock (including the intermediate 
inputs required to produce the final goods) is obtained from: 
ΔQ = A. ΔQ + ΔD      Eq. 3 
Solving for ΔQ yields the traditional result: 
ΔQ = (I-A)-1 . ΔD      Eq. 4 
Aggregating all sectoral effects, we have: 
δMIC = u. ΔMIC and δQ = u. ΔQ; with 
u: summation vector (1 x s), δMIC and δQ being scalar. 
The comparison between equations 2 and 4 is illustrative. Given that [M°. (I-A)-1] is a linear 
combination of fixed coefficients, at equilibrium, the ratio ( δMIC / δQ) is a constant within each 
country. As mentioned, because elasticity must be constant in any steady state regime, the observed 
increase in apparent trade elasticity during the 1990s could be attributed to a structural change, a 
transition from an inward-oriented business model (where parts and components are mainly sourced 
from the producing country) to a global one (intensive in trade in intermediate goods, where products 
are “Made in the World”). This structural shift corresponds to the “flattening of the World” mentioned 
by Tom Freidman.  
A “between countries” effect may have accentuated this “within country” trend. Because M°differs 
from country to country and is usually higher for (i) small economies and (ii) developing countries, the 
emergence of developing countries as major players in world trade would lead to a slow increase in the 
apparent trade-GDP elasticity, during the transition process. This effect explains probably part of the 
rise of the elasticity during the 1990s. Moreover, both “within” and “between” countries effects are 
closely linked, as the emergence of global manufacturing and the rise of “trade in tasks” led to the 
successful outcome of export-led growth strategies of emerging economies,  
•  Composition effects 
Nevertheless, this long term perspective tells only part of the story. Going back to equation 2, one notes 
that the initial shock [ΔD] is not a scalar, but a vector (s x 1). Individual shocks affecting each 
individual element of [D] (i.e, particular industries) do not need to be always in the same proportion 
from one year to another one. As the sectoral import requirements [M°s] differ from sector to sector, the 
short term apparent import elasticity will change according to the sectoral distribution of the shock.  10 
In particular, it was the case after the financial crisis of September 2008, as the demand of consumer 
durable and investment goods (consumer electronics, automobile and transport equipment, office 
equipment and computers, etc.) was particularly affected by the sudden stop in bank credits. Because 
these sectors are also vertically integrated, the impact on international trade in intermediate and final 
goods was high. And because services sectors, which are the main contributors to GDP in developed 
countries, were also more resilient to the financial crisis, the drop in imports (mainly goods) was much 
higher than the fall in GDP (mainly services).  Thus, in the initial phase of the financial crisis, the 
apparent Trade-GDP elasticity soared to more than 5.  
                                                                                                                                                          
9 In this traditional IO framework considering one country and the rest of the world, exports of intermediate 
goods are considered as being part of the final demand. The situation differs when extending the IO 
relationship to include international transactions of intermediate consumptions, as in equation 1.  
10 The more complex the production process, the more potential for gaining in outsourcing part of it (Box 1); 
thus it is natural to expect much more vertical integration in the manufacturing sector. Miroudot and 
Ragoussis (2009) show that manufacturing sectors in OECD countries generally use more imported inputs 
than other industrial and services sectors. It is specially the case for final consumer goods like ‘motor vehicles’ 
and ‘radio, TV and communication equipments’, or computers.  Services are, as expected, less vertically 
integrated into the world economy. But even these activities show an upward trend in the use of imported 
services inputs (e.g. business services). 
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Figure 3 World Production and GDP response, 1980-2009 (percentage growth and elasticity) 
 
Notes: Five year rolling periods. Production includes agriculture, mining and manufactures. 
Source: Based on WTO International Trade Statistics data base. 
 
The initial reaction of international trade to a large shock in demand was to overshoot GDP. Then, the 
initial impulse reverberated through the rest of the world economy, transforming the financial crisis into 
a great recession. After the initial shock, GDP will continue to slow down but the decrease in trade will 
stabilise as the import content of services sectors is much lower than those of manufacturing sectors.  
As can be seen in Figure 3, there is a negative correlation between the variation in the volume of 
production of goods and the growth in total GDP that can be attributed, at least partially, to this lag 
effect between goods and services. It is thus normal to expect a regression to normality of the trade 
elasticity for 2010. 11 
• Inventory effects 
But recent changes in the apparent trade elasticity are also probably linked to global supply chain 
management practices. Even under "just-in-time" management (production-to-order), geographically 
fragmented networks need to maintain a minimum level of inventories (buffer stocks) in order to face 
the usual risks attached to international transportation. While large players try to keep their inventories 
at the lowest possible level considering their sales plans and the acceptable level of risk, they tend in 
the same time to force their suppliers to maintain large stocks (production-to-stock) in order to be able 
to supply them quickly upon request. In addition, some up-stream suppliers, engaged in highly 
capitalistic processes such as foundries, need to process large batches in order to benefit from 
economies of scale and lower their unit costs.   
As a result, there is always a significant level of inventories in a global supply chain, translating into a 
higher demand for banking loans (E-G09). When a drop in final demand reduces the activity of down-
                                                 
11 [revised version] As a matter of facts, after a fall of 12% in trade volumes in 2009, world trade has grown by 
14.5% in 2010. Trade in 2010 overshot again GDP, but in the positive range this time, and it will take an 
additional year for elasticity to return to normal (trade was expected to grow at 6.5% in 2011). 
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stream firms, or/and when they face a credit crunch, their first reaction is to run down their inventories.  
Thus, a slow-down in activity transforms itself into a complete stand-still for the supplying firms that 
are located up-stream. These amplified fluctuations in ordering and inventory levels result in what is 
known as "bullwhip effect" in the management of production-distribution systems (Stadtler, 2008). As 
long as the down-stream inventories have not been reduced to their new optimum level, suppliers are 
facing a sudden stop in their activity and must reduce their labour force or keep it idle. 
The timing and intensity of the international transmission of supply shock may differ from traditional 
demand shocks applying on final goods. For example, the transmission index proposed by E-G09 
implicitly assumes that all secondary effects captured by the Ghosh inverse matrix occur 
simultaneously; in real world-economy, these effects may propagate more slowly than traditional final 
demand shocks depending on the length of the production chain and the existence of long-term 
contractual arrangements guaranteeing minimum level of orders.  For example, there might be 
contractual pre-commitments for the order of parts and material that manufacturers have to place well 
in advance in order to secure just-in-time delivery in accordance to their production plans (Uchida and 
Inomata, 2009).  Indeed, since the 1990s, suppliers in high-tech manufacturing are no more minor 
partners in global supply chains. These suppliers have consolidated and moved up in the global value 
chain, taking a more prominent role in the industry through a process of mergers and acquisitions 
(Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2009).  Lynn (2009) provides an example from the US automobile 
industry where key suppliers of parts had a quasi-monopolistic position and were able to impose their 
terms to the up-stream firms (automobile constructors).  
Nevertheless, in closely integrated networks, these mitigating effects are probably reduced, especially 
when the initial shock is large. A sudden stop in final demand is expected to reverberate quickly 
thorough the supply chain, as firms run-down their inventories in order to adjust to persistent changes 
in their market.  This inventory effect magnifies demand shocks and is principally to blame for the 
initial collapse of trade in manufacture that characterised the world economy from September 2008 to 
June 2009.  
Dvorak (2009), reporting on the exposition of the electronic equipment sector during the crisis, 
mentions that a fall in consumer purchase of 8% reverberated into a 10% drop in shipments of the final 
good and a 20% reduction in shipments of the chips that go into the product. The velocity of the cuts, 
according to operators, was much faster than in previous slumps, as reordering is now done on a weekly 
basis, instead of the monthly or quarterly schedules that prevailed up to the early 2000s. In addition, 
previously, supply chains were simpler, involving fewer links; the complexity of today's productive 
networks makes their management much more complex. 
When faced with an unprecedented crisis such as the September 2008 one, “everybody under-bet to a 
certain extent”, with forwards and backwards ricocheting effects through the supply chain, affecting in 
turn investment plans and capital goods providers.  Because the reactivation of the supply chain is only 
gradual, and final demand (household consumption and firm's investment) has been reduced because of 
higher unemployment and increased risk aversion, the road to recovery can be a slow and bumpy one.  
•  Trade finance 
Some 80% to 90% of world trade relies on some sort of trade finance, mostly of a short-term nature. 
Financing supply-chain operations – especially for small- and medium-size companies – is crucial to 
modern trade, and the potential damage to the real economy of shrinking trade finance is enormous 
(Auboin, 2009). Starting from a dual approach mixing international input-output matrices and monetary 
circuits, Escaith and Gonguet (2009) study the potential role of international supply chains as 
transmission channels for financial shocks. In particular, a credit crunch affecting trade finance can 
have a strong disruptive impact on international supply chains. Yet they mention also, citing anecdotal 
evidence from the automobile industry, that firms closely inserted in large supply chains can rely on 
their larger partners for liquidity, and may be sheltered from credit crunch. Firms located in emerging 
countries are more exposed to shocks reducing trade finance (Menichini, 2009).12 
                                                 
12 [revised version] Levchenko et al. (2010) do not find support for the hypothesis that trade credit has been 
important for the 2008-09 collapse. Available firm-level data in two European countries during the crisis seem 
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Exit scenarios and global supply chains 
 
The debate on the role of vertical specialization in shaping globalization and international trade is 
central for understanding the present crisis, but even more crucial for analysing alternative exit 
scenarios. In the second half of 2009, there were signs that the crisis was reaching a bottom.  Guided by 
"old" economic models, the major developed and developing economies, known as G-20, met head-on 
the risk of a world-wide depression and coordinated global responses in the early months of 2009. The 
package, reminiscent of traditional Keynesian recipes, addressed principally the macro-economic 
transmission channels through massive fiscal stimulus. With the risk of global recession diminishing 
after the second quarter of 2009, the debate has now shifted to the exit strategies.  
Analysts remained divided on the medium-run prospects. Alternatives conjectures range from "back-to-
business-as-usual" to "deglobalization" scenarios, offering a menu of alphabetical potages made of  L, 
U, V and Ws. The last three scenarios are roughly based on a return to normal, after a period of 
recession that could be short (V), long (U) or bumpy (W). The L scenario is more pessimistic for 
international trade, as it involves a lasting deterioration from the high levels of globalization registered 
during the 1990s and the 2000s.  
Pessimistic forecasts point to the huge fiscal deficits that have sustained public consumption in 
industrialized countries, while private consumption and investment remains depressed. If the danger of 
inflation seems under control, rebalancing the current account imbalances which characterized the pre-
crisis period would create an additional negative shock, as high spending countries would have to 
eventually increase their national savings. Most observers point to the USA and the UK, but also to the 
most vulnerable Euro-area countries (the PIGs).   
Rising transaction costs are also threatening supply chain operations. Oil prices have been on the rise 
for structural reasons (booming demand from large emerging countries), and this trend is expected to 
resume after the crisis. The collapse of world trade in 2008-2009 saw also the rise of murky 
protectionism as well as a higher risk aversion. All in all, the chances on the micro-economic side are 
that manufacturers abandon global strategies to repatriate their operations domestically, or maintain 
them within a closer regional perspective.  
The next sections will look into some of the macro and microeconomic aspects of the exit scenarios.  
• Supply Chains in Global Rebalancing  
 
During the 1990s, large trade imbalances developed in several regions of the world; the US has been 
running persistent deficits while Japan, Germany and later China, registering trade surpluses. Many 
believe that these imbalances, financed by an increase in US liabilities, created a persistent situation of 
financial distortion which led to the September 2008 crisis; the financial bubble drove also the growth 
of the UK economy, where financial services weight heavily in the economy. Similarly, the crisis 
questioned the economic sustainability of many periphery Euro-area countries, such as Ireland and 
Greece, but also Portugal or Spain.  
Rebalancing is therefore a key objective in the exit strategy, while many fears that such a rebalancing 
might lead to a secondary demand shock, “fragilizing” further the international financial system as such 
correction could only be possible thanks to a large correction in the bilateral exchange rates of 
concerned countries. From a macroeconomic perspective, rebalancing can be analysed from several 
angles; the present section will focus on two particular aspects: balance of payments and global 
                                                                                                                                                          
also to support the view that the traditional impacts of financial restriction on final demand, through a 
reduction of the intensive margin, dominated the supply-driven microeconomic disruptions that would have 
affected specific industrial channels through the extensive margin: Bricongne et al. (2010) show that the 
impact of credit constraints on the trade collapse has been rather limited for French firms; similarly, Behrens, 
Corcos and Mion (2010) conclude that the collapse of export volumes for Belgium firms was caused by a 
standard demand-driven trade shock. 
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effective demand. 
• Balance of Payments 
The pre-crisis years saw the encroachment of a polarized trade pattern, where large deficit from the US 
found their counterpart in large surplus in emerging countries, especially China, who accumulated 
international reserves denominated in dollar. At a smaller scale, a similar process occurred in the euro 
area, where deficit countries could finance their booming demand on the cheap, thanks to the strength 
of the euro. As occurs when a bicycle stops and fall, the borrow-and-consume pattern fall into pieces 
when credit vanished.  
According to many quarters, any sustainable recovery must address the global imbalances, in particular 
the twin US-China trade mismatch. 13 The role of supply chains in amplifying trade flows should prove 
a blessing when it comes to redress the bilateral “imbalances", particularly between the US and China. 
A back-of-the envelope calculation shows that the bilateral deficit of the USA vis-à-vis China measured 
with conventional trade statistics over-estimates the imbalances measured in value added content by 
about 60% (Table 2).  
This estimate, derived from an indirect measurement of value added content estimated from 
international input-output matrices, is based on the hypothesis of homogeneous production on the US 
side (i.e., the US production of final goods is similar for exports and for domestic use) and 
heterogeneity for China (technological dichotomy between firms producing for the domestic market 
and firms producing for exports, with higher import contents for the latter). 
 
Table 2 Bilateral trade balance China-USA, Gross vs. Value Added measurement. 
  
Note: Asymmetric trade flows were averaged, 
and may differ from balance of payments 
values. Value added content for US exports is 
about 0.9, based on input-output coefficients; 
the respective value for China was 0.8, and 
adjusted to 0.5 to account for re-exports and 
Export Processing Zones. 
Source: Author's estimate based on 
COMTRADE and IDE-JETRO data 
 
Because the domestic value added content of trade is lower than the gross commercial value recorded 
in the balance of payments, closing the gap between China and the USA will be faster and, more 
importantly, cheaper in terms of lost welfare. This said, measuring trade in value added may, as in this 
case, reduce bilateral imbalances, but in other instances it will increase it, or even change their sign 
(Daudin et al., 2009). From a balance of payments perspective, the overall imbalance of an economy 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world will remain the same. Thus, the US and China still need to adjust their 
domestic demand and change their composition; but the implications in terms of effective bilateral 
exchange rates adjustments are much different. More importantly for international politics and global 
governance, measuring trade in value added makes clear that rebalancing is chiefly a matter of 
domestic policy. 
 
• Global Effective Demand  
Even if some bilateral imbalances may prove easier to resolve, it remains that the rebalancing will 
imply for the deficit countries a relative decrease in domestic absorption and an exacerbated 
competition to generate net exports in order to sustain final demand. These forces will lead to 
                                                 
13 The issue of choosing the appropriate timing for reducing "Keynesian" type policies and reduce fiscal and 
monetary stimuli is a difficult one for Western economies. Indeed, curren-account reversals are often 
disruptive and the expected long-term benefits of rebalancing have a short term cost.  
Billion USD 2000 2008 
1. US exports to China 19 77 
2. Chinese exports to USA 80 305 
       Balance (1-2) (61) (228) 
3. US-VA exports to China 18 70 
4. Chinese VA exports to USA 40 152 
       Balance (3-4) (22) (83) 
5. Ratio (3-4)/(1-2) 0.4 0.4 
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fundamental changes in the source of global effective demand, from an "older industrialized West" to 
an "emerging East". 14 Because of the difference in consumer behaviour between these two groups of 
countries, such an exit scenario implies, at least for the medium term, a relative reduction in the 
international demand for labour intensive manufactured consumer goods (from clothing to consumer 
electronics) and an increase in demand for commodities (agricultural, fuels and minerals) and 
investment goods.  
In addition, un-coordinated “Keynesian” policies may prove ineffective in a situation where final 
demand (both domestic and exports) has a large imported contents. As was indicated in equation 4, the 
expected total increase in production engineered by an increase in demand in the traditional Leontief 
model is: 
ΔQ =  (I-A)-1 . ΔD      Eq. 4 
On the other hand, the higher the vertical specialization of an economy, the higher its reliance on 
imported inputs (the [ M°] in equation 2). 
Combining equations 2 and 4, the net sectoral effect on the domestic economy is: 
ΔQD= (I- M°). (I-A)-1. ΔD              Eq. 5 
Aggregating across sectors, we obtain δQD = u . ΔQD 
As modern economies are characterized by increasing levels of vertical specialization (Miroudot and 
Ragoussis, 2009), [M°] is higher now than it was twenty or thirty years ago. Traditional counter-
cyclical economies become less efficient as demand for intermediate imported goods adds to the 
imports of final goods (for consumption and investment), unless governments focus their demand 
impulse on relatively closed sectors dealing with non-tradable or less-traded goods and services. 
Another temptation is to raise protective barriers to decrease M° as well as demand for imported final 
goods. As this second-best strategy has clear limits in an inter-connected world economy, 15 the first-
best strategy is to coordinate internationally the macro-economic response to global shocks. Indeed, the 
2008-2009 crisis did not developed into a 1929-like great depression, as feared by many economists —or 
excitedly awaited by some alternative quarters— because the major developed and developing 
economies were able to sit-down and meet in the G-20 to coordinate a global response in the early 
months of 2009.  The sustainability of this first-best solution will eventually depend upon the capacity 
of national policy makers to resist the temptation of playing foul and opt for un-cooperative 
protectionist policies, answered in turn by Tit-for-Tat counter-policies from their trade partners.   
• Deglobalization risks in a post-crisis scenario 
 
The globalization process may effectively be expected to slow down in the years to come. A September 
2009 report by OECD, UNCTAD and WTO prepared before G-20 leaders meet in Pittsburgh states that 
as most leading economies have invoked "trade defence mechanisms" to weather the downturn, and the 
growing unemployment due to the crisis will also continue to fuel protectionist pressures for the years 
to come. 16 Analysts are also concerned about longer term developments, fearing that the West-to-East 
repositioning of the world trade gravity centre may spur a series of "buy domestic" and "produce where 
                                                 
14 The term "emerging East" may include some western hemisphere countries, like Brazil or Mexico. The concept 
of effective demand refers to a demand-driven model, where production responds to final demand and where 
some large importing countries (typically the USA and the EU in the pre-crisis scenario) play the role of world 
locomotive. 
15 Higher demand for non-traded products over-appreciates the real exchange rate and depresses international 
competitiveness and the production of tradables, while beggar-your-neighbours policy is usually matched by 
similar moves by trade partners which nullify, and ultimately reverse, the expected outcome. 
16 "Report on G20: Trade and Investment Measures", 14 September 2009. 
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you sell" pressures, leading to renewed trade and investment confrontations and an increase in 
protectionism. 
This outcome would have dire consequences on global value chains, and the related international 
production networks. 17 Indeed, supply chains are very sensitive to even small increase in transaction 
costs, be they caused by higher tariffs or oil prices. A series of not-so-anecdotic evidences tend to 
support this hypothesis. In August 2009, the head of Ernst & Young's supply chains department 
declared that regulatory changes and also the downturn are forcing many organizations to consider 
restructuring their supply chains, leading to smaller and more regional supply chains (Financial Times, 
9 August 2009). 
This deglobalization is not only linked to the present crisis situation, but may be more structurally 
caused by the difficulties of decentralizing increasingly complex industrial procedures. For example, 
after an accumulation of delays, and confronted with a series of difficulties in the production of its 
latest model, Boeing decided to abandon the original fragmented chain and repatriate key production 
processes in its main establishments. Differentiated regional markets, as well as political pressure to 
voluntarily restrict exports and “build where they sell” have also encourage automobile constructers to 
relocate their final assembly closer to their final markets, keeping only the heavy engineering work 
truly global (Sturgeon and van Biesebroeck, 2009).   
Moreover, firms established in mature Western markets —the leader of present global value chains— may 
not be the best placed to surf on the new demand wave created by the rise of a large middle class in 
emerging countries.  Increased demand from these new consumers, whose absolute income remains 
much lower than their middle class counterparts in the West, tends to focus on basic needs (housing, 
food, health and education) and commodity-like manufactured goods (e.g., no-frill vehicles such the 
Tata’s Nano). Meanwhile, large companies from Brazil, China, India or other emerging countries no 
longer restrict their operations on their local markets, but invest internationally and challenge Western 
multinational firms, including in their home markets. 
Other structural factors are also at work, which may increase transaction costs and push global firms to 
reconsider their production networks. Since 2003, oil price has been increasing, reflecting, inter alia, 
the additional demand coming from large emerging countries. This trend is probably installed for some 
time now, and production mangers will have to adapt to a future where energy is more expensive and 
less plentifully available. The same structural factors that led to an increase in the consumption of fossil 
fuels are also causing a change in the perception of businesses, consumers, and policy makers.  Indeed, 
carbon footprints (accumulated CO2 emissions) have become increasingly associated with supply chain 
or through the life-cycle of a product. Using input-output matrices, Hertwich and Glenp (2009) 
calculates that trade margins –representing the accumulated emissions from distribution between the 
producer and final consume– account for 5.5% of greenhouse gases emissions.  
As concerns about global warming increases, purchasing managers are concerned about the carbon 
footprint of their supply chains, while consumers are increasingly offered carbon-labelled products and 
economists talk about internalizing environment costs through ad hoc consumption taxes. As these 
trends accentuate, there will be a natural tendency to shorten global supply rely more on regional or 
domestic networks. 
If those trends are confirmed, this underlying deglobalization process would hinder the medium-term 
possibilities of recovery for international trade at its pre-crisis level. Because the most dynamic markets 
are in emerging countries, a regionalization or a repatriation of global supply chain would negatively 
affect developed countries' exports of intermediate goods, slowing down their recovery and augmenting 
the risk for an L shaped exit pattern. But because global supply chains are a source of efficiency gains 
and technical progress diffusion (see Box 1 again), even emerging countries would see their potential 
growth reduced in the process.  
                                                 
17 Global value chains include the conception and marketing aspects of the products, and are sensitive to risk of 
breaches in intellectual property and patents; their production component (the supply chains) are also highly 
sensitive to international and cross-border transaction costs as the goods for processing typically cross several 
border during production. 
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o Least Developed Countries and the deglobalization risk  
More importantly, deglobalization may also deprive the poorest developing countries, located far from 
established or emerging markets, of the opportunities of following the industrialization path taken by 
China or Mexico, a powerful strategy for frog-leaping through the Rostovian take-off model by 
attracting foreign direct investment, creating large volume of manufacturing jobs and transferring 
technologies (Box 2). Thus the micro-economic debate on the future of global supply chains spills over 
very critical trade and development issues.  
Adjusting to this trend will prove difficult for non-emerging countries, both in the North and the South. 
Even for resource rich developing and least developed countries, which are benefiting from the increase 
in commodity prices (see box 3), the long term impact on their development prospects is not clear. 
From both the effective demand and the sustainable development perspective, exporting non-renewable 
commodities does not have the same benefits than exporting labour-intensive merchandises.  
For the poorest deficit developing countries, which cannot count on net export of oil and other 
commodities, the situation will be worst. The potential for inserting themselves in global supply chains 
and export labour intensive products to the North will decline in the same time as their import bill in oil 
Box 2. Global Supply Chains, Industrialization  and Development 
There is a heated debate, reminiscent of the 1970s controversies about the role of trans-national corporations, 
between the liberal and the heterodox schools on the role of global supply chains in fostering industrialization or, at 
the contrary, causing "inmisering growth", low labour standards and more informality.   
Graph B2 Economies with significant share of processing trade in total exports 
The establishment of export processing zones (EPZs) in developing countries and their success in attracting foreign 
direct investment have usually been balanced by a bias towards a low qualification and low salary profile for their 
employees. Because the establishments in EPzs in lesser advanced developing countries are predominantly labour 
intensive and foot-loose industries (e.g., apparel and garments), critics to an industrial strategy based on processing 
industries point to (i) their lack of backward and forward linkages with other domestic industries; (ii) their reliance on 
informal markets to lower labour costs; and (iii) their sensitivity to conjunctural downturns. Partial field data from 
Asian countries on the impact of the crisis show declines in both average working hours and average earnings, 
especially in footwear and furniture industries. In addition, it seems that the crisis hurt more the formal sector, while 
the informal sector saw increases in average working hours (Hurst, Buttle and Sandars, 2009). 
The controversy is partially based on an erroneous supposition that inward oriented (domestically integrated) and 
outward oriented (globally connected to supply chains) industrialization processes are mutually exclusive forms of 
industrialization for developing countries. It needs not being so as capital and skill requirements are quite different, 
especially at the earliest stages of the export-processing industrialization.  
Bacchetta, Bustamente and Ernst (2009) indicates that EPZs actually compete more with informal activities than 
established national industries, "offering better, more stable employment opportunities for those previously working in 
the informal economy" (p.111). Using the tools of structural economics, Escaith (2007) shows also that outward-
oriented Asian economies, which inserted themselves actively in global supply chains, were able to successfully 
absorb their growing active population, while the more domestic based manufactures in Latin American countries 
could not provide enough formal jobs in the manufacturing sectors to the new entrants, pushing them instead into a 
growing urban informal service sector. 
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and food will increase.  The reshaping of global effective demand in any future scenario is of particular 
importance for these labour abundant developing countries that where relying on the strength of the 
global supply chain movement to attract productive investments.  
Global Supply Chains are based on comparative advantages derived from costs and specialization. 
Complementarities based on cost differential between countries arise naturally when factors 
endowments are very different. This explains the specialization in trade in tasks between industrialised 
economies and labour abundant developing countries. Complementarities based on specialization are, at 
the contrary, the domain of intra-sectoral trade between complex industries, typical of the developed 
economies (for example, intra-EU trade in manufacture).  
The capacity of LDCs and least-advanced developing countries to successfully insert themselves into 
supply chains led by, and for, emerging economies is still unclear. The difference in factor endowments 
and production costs is not large (as in the case of mature industrialised countries), and most emerging 
countries still count with a large reservoir of labour. The issue is particularly acute for African lesser 
advanced economies, where transaction costs (both monetary and in terms of transportation time) 
remain prohibitive, compared to larger developing Asian or American countries. For the time being, the 
preferential treatment granted by industrialised countries (EBA in the case of the EU, or AGOA for the 
US) are gradually eroded by the structural trend in these advanced economies of reducing MFN tariffs 
and importing an increasing share of their demand under duty free treatment. 18  
Thus, besides fostering trade facilitation to reduce monetary and non-monetary transaction costs, one 
issue for LDCs and other lesser advanced economies located far from Emerging East would be to 
receive significant duty-free quota-free access to these burgeoning markets, where MFN tariffs are 
usually much higher than for industrialised economies. 
 
                                                 
18 It has been estimated that when preferences are lower than 4 percentage points, they become ineffective in 
promoting exports. 
Box 3: Least Developed Countries Exports: Products and Markets
Export concentration has been a structural characteristic of LDC economies. Almost three quarters of LDC total 
merchandise exports depends upon only three main products (which change from country to country), accounting 
sometimes for more than 95 per cent of export receipts. The recent trends in commodity prices reinforce this 
tendency, not only by increasing the weight of those commodities, but also for discouraging diversification efforts.  
The value of fuels and mineral exports between 2000 and 2007 rose annually by more than 27 per cent and 
represent now 67 per cent of total LDC exports.  For commodity exporters, the non-traditional (labour intensive) 
activities appear less lucrative to domestic investors due to their lower relative prices.  In addition, exchange rate 
appreciation linked to commodity booms – the so-called Dutch Disease – reduces the international 
competitiveness of labour intensive activities, such as light manufacture. This increased concentration on 
commodities reduced the weight of clothing, the second product in importance, to below 13 per cent for the LDC 
group.  All other product groups, including agriculture, are now contributing less than 10 per cent to the total export 
value.   
The market for LDC exports have increasingly become diversified, with developing economies, such as China, 
India and Thailand having a greater weight in LDC exports than one would expect from their share in world total 
imports. As a result developing economies have become the major destination for LDC exports of mineral fuels 
(56 per cent in 2006), copper (83 per cent), wood products (87 per cent), cotton (89 per cent) or some food 
products like vegetables and oil seeds (84 and 73 per cent).  On the contrary, developed economies remain largely 
a dominant export destination for manufactured articles such as clothing (95 per cent) and some high value-added 
agricultural and food products such as fish and crustaceans, beverages or tobacco, with 67, 73 and 57 per cent, 
respectively. 
Service exports are of particular importance to some LDCs. Travel, a close proxy of tourism receipts, is the 
dominant sector, representing 52 per cent of their services exports in 2008.  This activity grew steadily since the 
beginning of 2000, at an average annual rate of 15 per cent, and was particularly dynamic during the last three 
years.  This promising sector is vulnerable in the present economic cycle, because a large part of these revenues 
originate from tourists arriving from developed countries, where the economic impact of the crisis has been 
primarily felt. 
Source: WTO "Market Access for Products and Services of Export Interest to Least-Developed Countries"  
WT/COMTD/LDC/W/46, October 2009. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
The geographical segmentation of industrial production has played a major role in shaping international 
economy in the past 15 years. It was at the root of the emergence of new global players, such as China 
or Malaysia, and the correlated dramatic reduction in absolute poverty levels. It allowed also some old 
industrial economies like Germany or the USA, to regain international competitiveness through 
increased productivity and efficiency. In the same time, the content of merchandise statistics and the 
economic significance of trade balances became more and more difficult to interpret.   
Supply chains reshaped international trade and changed the relationship between trade and 
development: the surge of trade in intermediate commodities remodeled regional and international 
networks through a bottom-up angle and forced governments to reconsider the previous identification 
of industrial development with protectionism; developing countries were able to leap-frog the 
traditional industrialization phases by inserting themselves into complex industrial networks; the criss-
crossing of manufacture networks led to large investments in transportation equipment and 
infrastructure in order to accommodate the huge transit of goods for processing that removed 
bottlenecks and favored economic development.  
Off-shoring altered also the social panorama. If global economic and welfare benefits have been 
substantial, their distribution remains contentious. While creating numerous jobs in emerging countries, 
outsourcing and offshoring increased wage disparity in both developed and developing economies, 
fuelling an active political debate on the pro and cons of globalization. 
Instead of observing a decoupling of developing countries, global supply chains have strengthened the 
complementarities as well as the competition between industrialised and emerging economies. Their 
role in the synchronization of trade collapse that followed the financial crisis of September 2008 has 
been determinant. And determinant is also their role in shaping the alternative exit scenarios from the 
Great Recession, as is their future contribution in any post-crisis scenario. 
The increase in objective and subjective transaction costs, from higher oil prices to "buy local" 
campaigns and murky protectionism, indicates that in the future, supply chains will probably be smaller 
and more regional. Let unchecked, these centripetal forces may cause a deglobalization process which 
will directly affect less advanced developing economies but, in the end, will also be detrimental to both 
developed and emerging countries.   
Yet, against this pessimistic outcome, many considerations militate in favour of productive network 
continuing to extend their global reach. In the short run, abandoning the present global network of 
suppliers carries a heavy cost for the multinational firms.  Off-shoring has been a central objective of 
many key industries, which heavily invested in their international network. Often, the new plants build 
off-shore are more modern and efficient than the older domestic ones, and selling them to a competitor 
would create a comparative disadvantage (remember the dilemma of GM when selling Opel).  
In the longer run, the constant flow of innovations and the extension of the technological frontier are 
lowering the cost of communication and creating new opportunities for redesigning the international 
division of labour. The technical factors that made possible the internationalization of production, from 
the IT revolution to innovations in engineering and business management, still promote further 
"flattening of the Earth".  
Large emerging countries are becoming new markets for final goods that reshape existing production 
networks, while new actors are emerging from the "not-so-emerging" countries. Thus deglobalization is 
probably a distant menace on objective grounds, even if it is a new global effective demand that will 
drive the world economy, forcing some difficult adjustments. Indeed, the 2008-2009 crisis is a 
structural break, and the world economy will certainly not return to "business as usual". Old giants 
tumbled, new global players emerged. Public opinion is also changing and the citizens' concerns on the 
lack of governance of the previous phase of globalization will have to be addressed, while the present 
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gains in opening trade opportunities, in particular for least developed countries, will have to be 
preserved. 
            Post face to the revised version, June 2011. 
As recalled by The Economist Intelligence Unit, the global crisis was in part a crisis of globalization, 
and raised fears of backlash against the internationalisation of flows of goods, capital and people that 
has been one of the overriding trends of the past three decades. 19 With economic recovery under way 
and international trade back to normal in 2011 after a strong rebound in 2010, the world economy 
seems to enter a new era of globalization, characterised by its multi-polarity, and will avoid a 
regression to national trade fortresses.  
Since the October 2009 OECD conference when this paper was presented, the role of international 
supply chains in explaining the depth and synchronization of the 2008-2009 trade collapse has been 
more thoroughly examined. Inter alia, Di Mauro and Mandel (2011) edited a review of the factors 
contributing to the high elasticity observed during the crisis. The consensus tends to indicate that tt is 
not because of global value chains per se that industries, such as the automotive industry, were severely 
impacted, but rather because of abrupt shifts in demand and consumer preferences during the recession. 
The swings in world trade should not be explained by structural high trade elasticity created by the 
fragmentation of global manufacturing, but by the sheer size of the initial financial shock and the new 
microeconomic transmission channels created by global supply chains.  
Indeed, after two years of roller-coaster in 2009 and 2010, where world trade overshot world GDP, the 
2011 forecasts point to a return to normality. Growth in volume should stabilise at about 7 per cent, 
with an income elasticity of 2, both parameters being in line with their long-run average (figure 4). 
Japan's earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 showed both the fragility of international supply chains 
to a major disruption of a key partner, and the resilience of international trade, as the global economic 
impact was expected to remain limited (Escaith et al., 2011). 
Figure 4: Growth rates of world exports, 2005-2011 (in volume) 
 
Source: WTO (2011:  forecast) 
Seen from the mid-2011, the 2008-2009 trade collapse looks like a standard –yet outsized– effect of a 
fall in the demand for durable goods and postponed purchases of intermediates drawing down 
inventories.  Eventually, supply-side disruptions –caused by a shortage of trade finance, the interruption 
and breaking-down of international supply chains, and the increase in tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers– played a minor role. Thus, the Great Trade Collapse is seen more a tale of greater economic 
interdependence and short-term volatility than a structural and irreversible shift in trade elasticity, 
unwarranted systemic instability and rampant deglobalization.  
Yet, this crisis was –and remains– a call to both academics and policy makers to have a closer look at 
the role of global value chains in explaining today’s international economy. The World Trade 
Organization launched in 2001 a dedicated website on the implications of “Made in the World” on 
                                                 
19 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 10 January 2011. 
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trade policy. 20  OECD and World Bank jointly launched a book in September 2010 on the implications 
of global value chains on the world economy (Cattaneo, Gereffi and Staritz, 2010). It reviews, in 
particular, the opportunities for developing countries, with a particular focus on entry and upgrading 
possibilities in global value chains. But the development prospects for the resource-poor lesser 
developed countries located at the periphery of the global or regional value chains remains –as it were 
at the time of writing this conference paper– a huge challenge for both the international community and 
the LDCs’ policy makers.   
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